discussed by a court is one of the highest compliments a legal scholar can receive. Thus, it is the height of irony that judges have discussed or alluded to the works of novelist John Grisham-an attorney who has never authored a law review article-in over two dozen opinions. Ironic though it may be, it is not entirely unexpected, given that even the Harvard Law Review and the Index of Legal Periodicals are no match for Penguin Random House and the New York Times Bestsellers List. While clerks skimming a database or flipping through bound volumes in the stacks of a law library can overlook an essay or a study, the tales of John Grisham, whether in paperback or on the silver screen, are difficult to escape. But do Grisham's legal thrillers have literary merit? Are they suitable for inclusion in judicial opinions?
The question of literary merit is a controversy that plagued the American university in the last years of the 20th century. Following the 1987 publication of political philosopher Allan Bloom's The Closing of the American Mind-a damning indictment of higher education for what Bloom saw as its intellectual and moral bankruptcy-a debate erupted in English departments about which authors properly belong in the canon: those texts essential to attaining a liberal education. 1 The traditionalists, Bloom's allies, firmly believed that colleges and universities should teach only the "Great Books." 2 Their opponents, the "cultural relativists," many of whom witnessed or participated in the counterculture movement of the 1960s, were troubled by the fact that the canon consisted almost entirely of "dead white European males"; marching under the banners of 2. Bloom defines the "Great Books" as "certain generally recognized classic texts." ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 344 (1987) . Although he concedes to certain criticisms of this approach to education, he opines that "one thing is certain: wherever the Great Books make up a central part of the curriculum, the students are excited and satisfied, feel they are doing something that is independent and fulfilling, getting something from the university they cannot get elsewhere." Id.
Marxism, critical theory, feminism, critical race theory, etc., they argued that these authors did not sufficiently represent the breadth of human experience. 3 In some cases, they rejected the very notion of a universal human experience. 4 For this reason, they insisted on including books written by women and racial minorities. 5 The cultural relativists won this dispute, and English departments expanded reading lists accordingly. 6 Despite the decline of the traditional canon and the more expansive view of literature found on the contemporary university campus, the distinction between literary and genre fiction persists.
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Whereas the first is said to be an artistic work that is difficult to classify, the latter easily falls into a genre and is thought to be written primarily for the purpose of entertainment and, thus, commercial success.
8 These labels are complicated, however, when one considers 12 Indeed, we are forced to accord cultural significance to Grisham's novels and their film adaptions when we consider how they have served as a major source of exposure to the inner workings of the courtroom and the legal profession for countless Americans over the past three decades. 13 Therefore, it should come as no surprise that judges have chosen to refer to Grisham's novels.
Perhaps this phenomenon indicates that judges also enjoy Grisham's suspenseful accounts of lawyers and litigants faced with a system stacked against them from the outset. It could also be that judges believe that analogizing to popular literature will make the law at hand easier to comprehend and their opinions more entertaining to read.
14 Whether it points to a shared literature or an attempt by jurists to write more readable opinions, the results are surely encouraging for those who fear that the legal system grows increasingly alien to the average person. It may be a small sign that judges have some 12. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW & LITERATURE 55 (3rd ed. 2009). Indeed, Posner's main criticism of Grisham's novels-and much more his early novels than his later ones-is not so much that they lack merit, but that they display a certain moral simplicity. Id. 14. For a discussion of references to popular culture as tools of persuasion in legal rhetoric, specifically Grisham's novels, see Victoria S. Salzmann, Honey, You're Not June Cleaver: The Power of "Dropping Pop" to Persuade, 62 ME. L. REV. 241, 256-57 (2010).
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Of course, all of this raises the embarrassing question of whether the law is upstream or downstream of culture. Do judges hand down law that informs culture, or does culture mold judges who remake law in its image? This modest bibliographical study does not seek to answer such a difficult and troubling philosophical question, but merely explicates the phenomenon so that readers can draw their own conclusions about why judges use literature and, more specifically, Grisham's legal thrillers.
This study begins with an explanation of methodology and an annotated bibliography of the results. Next, the author discusses the various ways that courts have used Grisham's works, categorizing each case according to its function. The author concludes with further speculation about why judges are drawn to Grisham's novels.
II. METHODOLOGY
The author searched for "John Grisham" in cases across several commercial databases. These searches included both state and federal courts in all United States jurisdictions. The author then examined the yield and retained only cases in which the judge unilaterally used some part of the Grisham corpus as a literary tool according to Henderson's definition. 15 The study preserves the remaining cases as annotated for context. In this case, the plaintiffs bring a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") claim alleging that law firms employed by a fungicide corporation were an enterprise of that entity. Chief Judge Sidney Runyan Thomas writes that the plaintiffs are "taking a page out of a John Grisham novel," alluding to The Firm (1991 In this action for attorney's fees and sanctions, Judge Tanya Walton Pratt opines that the attorney's actions at issue, namely trolling public dockets and employing a private investigator to cold-call potential plaintiffs who had previously sued the defendant, "are far worse than the garden-variety 'ambulance chasing'-seen in movies and read about in John Grisham novels-that gives the public a negative perception of the legal profession." In this opinion, the majority found that a defendant does not possess a right to compel production of police reports because there is no "enforceable right to subpoena police investigation reports and nonprivileged materials before a preliminary examination."
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In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson argues that the majority "errs in musing that law enforcement and the district attorney perhaps may be treated as one."
49 In a footnote, she adds: Law enforcement's task is to objectively gather all the evidence in pursuit of the truth, rather than to attempt to hone in early on a suspect and build a case against him or her. . . . Following the reversal of a conviction for first-degree murder, the exonerated defendant applied to the court requesting a determination that he was wrongfully imprisoned and, therefore, entitled to compensation. Writing for the majority, Justice Mark S. Cady found that "the crux of the right to seek recovery as a wrongfully imprisoned person [ If Mr. Taylor had intended to be a stealth juror leading a runaway jury, he did a poor job of concealing it by providing answers in the questionnaire that he was a 28-year former smoker now "clean" for five years, mentioning his many attempts to quit smoking, and acknowledging his family members who smoked or who he believed were adversely affected by smoking. Cf. John Grisham, The Runaway Jury (1996) (a work of fiction where a prospective juror actively hid his past and hid strongly held beliefs in order to be selected as a juror and influence a substantial verdict against a tobacco company). In a dispute over attorney's fees-especially those fees generated through in-house conferences-Justice Phillip D. Hardberger reproduces a passage about "the art of billing" from The Rainmaker (1995) to illustrate that conferences are "a part of the fabric of the law." He goes on to say that "Grisham's quote implies potential abuse of conferences, and no doubt it happens. The more common problem though is that the conference, while well-meaning, turns out to be useless: nothing accomplished." Comparing the above cases, we can group them according to how they interact with the Grisham corpus. In doing so, three distinct categories arise: (1) John Grisham qua brand; (2) acts of intertextuality in which the text of the opinion relies upon the text of one of Grisham's legal thrillers; and (3) citation to one of Grisham's novels as an authority to be considered. The following section discusses the cases in each of these categories.
A. Brand
One potential methodological criticism of this Essay is that even the most superficial mentions of Grisham and his works appear in the study's bibliography. This recognizes, however, that the advent of a pop-culture reference to a figure or work can tell us more about its influence than a detailed recitation of its attributes. As Grisham himself told The Guardian in a November 2011 interview, "My name became a brand and I'd love to say it was the plan from the start . . . but the only plan was to keep writing books." 
